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Research Article
The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy
Decision-Making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey
Gerasimos Tsourapas
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Howdoes forcedmigration affect the politics of host states and, in particular, howdoes it impact states’
foreign policy decision-making? The relevant literature on refugee politics has yet to fully explore how
forced migration affects host states’ behavior. One possibility is that they will employ their position
in order to extract revenue from other state or nonstate actors for maintaining refugee groups within
their borders. This article explores the workings of these refugee rentier states, namely states seek-
ing to leverage their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain. It focuses
on the Syrian refugee crisis, examining the foreign policy responses of three major host states—
Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. While all three engaged in post-2011 refugee rent-seeking behavior,
Jordan and Lebanon deployed a back-scratching strategy based on bargains, while Turkey deployed
a blackmailing strategy based on threats. Drawing upon primary sources in English and Arabic, the
article inductively examines the choice of strategy and argues that it depended on the size of the host
state’s refugee community and domestic elites’ perception of their geostrategic importance vis-à-vis
the target. The article concludes with a discussion of these findings’ significance for understanding
the international dimension of the Syrian refugee crisis and argues that they also pave the way for
future research on the effects of forced displacement on host states’ political development.
Keywords: Middle East, forced displacement, inductive inquiry, case studies, migration, refugee rentier states
Introduction
“We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime
and we can put the refugees on buses,” Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an declared to a group of European
Union (EU) senior officials in February 2016. “So how
will you deal with refugees if you don’t get a deal? Kill
the refugees?” (Reuters 2016a). A year before this, the
Greek Minister of Defense Panos Kammenos threatened
that “we cannot keep ISIS out if the EU keeps bullying us”
(Aldrick and Carassava 2015). Other host states in the
region—namely Lebanon and Jordan—have also repeat-
edly voiced their need for international economic assis-
tance albeit by promising to continue supporting refugee
populations within their borders. Indeed, forced migra-
tion often generates tensions in global politics and varied
reactions by host states, most strikingly in the responses
to the post-2011 displacement of Syrians across the Mid-
dle East and beyond. Existing theorization of host states’
engagement with forced migration flows indicates that
they may aim to benefit from such outflows in an ag-
gressive manner, even if they played no part in generat-
ing them. But this does not account for the full gamut
of host states’ foreign policy choices or some states’ ab-
stention from the use of coercion. This article aims to ex-
pand our understanding of the interplay between forced
migration and power politics within the context of the
Syrian refugee crisis, in order to address how refugee
flows affect host states’ foreign policy.
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2 The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
I argue that a host state’s domestic elites often
approach refugee communities as potential sources of
revenue. I introduce the term refugee rentier states to
describe states that employ their position as host states
of forcibly displaced populations to extract revenue,
or refugee rent, from other state or nonstate actors in
order to maintain these populations within their borders.
Building on international relations literature on issue-
linkage strategies, I identify two strategies through which
a host state may exercise refugee rent-seeking behavior
in its foreign policy: via blackmailing—threatening to
flood a target state(s) with refugee populations within its
borders, unless compensated—or via back-scratching—
promising to maintain refugee populations within its
borders, if compensated. Recognizing that a state’s policy
choice is rarely a simple binary between coercion and
cooperation, I operationalize the two strategies with
regard to specific patterns that allows to distinguish
specific behavior patterns in host states’ policies. Using a
three-case-study approach to examine the foreign policy
behavior of the main host states of displaced Syrian
communities since 2011, my data suggests that a host
state’s choice between blackmailing or back-scratching
depends on domestic elites’ perception vis-à-vis the
target state(s). Drawing on data collected in Jordan,
Lebanon, and Turkey, I argue that a strategy of black-
mailing is adopted when domestic elites believe that
their state is geopolitically important vis-a-vis the target
state(s) and they host a significant number of refugees.
Otherwise, they are more likely to employ a strategy of
back-scratching.
The article proceeds as follows. I review the relevant
literature and present my theoretical model. I then intro-
duce three case studies that will allow for further theory
development via covariation and within-case analysis.
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are selected for they con-
stitute the largest host states of displaced Syrians in the
post-2011 Middle East. I demonstrate how Lebanon and
Jordan adopted a strategy of back-scratching in their
foreign policy because, even though they believed they
hosted large communities of Syrian refugees, they did not
consider themselves geopolitically important vis-à-vis
the European Union (EU). In sharp contrast, Turkey
adopted a blackmailing strategy that can be explained
by state elites’ perception of Turkey’s geopolitical im-
portance and the large size of Syrian refugees residing
within its borders. I continue by explicitly discounting
alternative explanations that may account for the three
states’ foreign policy-making. I conclude with a note of
how additional research may shed light on how forced
displacement affects refugee rentier states’ domestic
political development, particularly with regard to en-
couraging opportunities for state corruption, autocracy,
and other pathologies associated with rentierism.
Investigating the Politics of Host States’
Forced Migration Management
How does forced migration affect the politics of host
states, and, in particular, how do the latter employ the
presence of refugees in their foreign policy decision-
making? A long line of international relations schol-
ars has attempted to address these questions, albeit not
systematically. As Betts and Loescher argue, “only rela-
tively isolated pockets of theoretically informed literature
have emerged on the international politics of forced mi-
gration,” while the study of refugee politics has yet to
form part of mainstream international relations (Betts
and Loescher 2011, 12–13). This is not to undermine
the work of international politics scholars who criti-
cally examined the emergence of the international refugee
regime, andwho pioneered empirical work on the politics
of forced migration (Gordenker 1987; Zolberg 1989),
primarily within the context of interstate conflict. Dur-
ing the Cold War, superpower rivalry resulted in forced
displacement across developing states of the ThirdWorld
(Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). It also shaped the
refugee policy of American policy-makers, with Wash-
ington considering refugees “a weapon in the cold war”
(Zolberg 1988, 661; Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Munz
and Weiner 1997; Adamson 2006, 190). Beyond the
United States’ aiding of “lone individuals crossing bor-
ders to seek political freedom in the West” (Stedman and
Tanner 2004, 5), host states also used refugees instrumen-
tally in military conflicts, while numerous states sought
to “embarrass or discredit adversary nations” by allow-
ing refugee flows or to use them against an “adversar-
ial neighboring regime” (Teitelbaum 1984). In the Mid-
dle East, the status of Palestinian refugees served as a
strategic asset for Arab states’ ongoing struggle against
Israel (Hinnebusch 2003, 157); in the Rwandan and Pak-
istani contexts, humanitarian aid to refugee camps fu-
eled violence by providing legitimacy and support to mil-
itants (Lischer 2003). In fact, research has demonstrated
the wide impact of refugees in the diffusion and exac-
erbation of conflict (Lischer 2015), with Kaldor includ-
ing displacement as a form of post-1989 “new wars” in
the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere (Kaldor
2013).
At the same time, the socioeconomic and politi-
cal risks perceived to be associated with hosting large
numbers of refugees has led to lukewarm responses in
tackling the problem of forced migration (Zolberg 1989,
415; Loescher 1996, 8). This also highlights some of the
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main problems behind the development of a functional
global refugee regime (Betts 2011), as “states have a le-
gal obligation to support refugees on their own territory,
[but] they have no legal obligation to support refugees on
the territory of other states” (Betts and Loescher 2011,
19). Tackling this dichotomy lies at the heart of host
states’ political engagement with forced migration. For
historical and structural reasons, states across the Global
South feature the large majority of refugee populations,
which creates a power asymmetry with seemingly unaf-
fected Global North states. Yet, Global North states con-
tinue to provide economic support for the governments
of refugee host states in the Global South in an act of “cal-
culated kindness” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986; cf. Arar
2017b). From a security perspective, they do so aiming
to prevent the diffusion of forced displacement into their
own territory, be it North America (Weiner 1992, 101)
or Europe (Huysmans 2000; Greenhill 2016). In attempt-
ing to examine how the North-South asymmetry may be
perceived from the point of view of refugee host states,
forcibly displaced populations arguably become a source
of revenue, particularly given Western states’ tendency to
offer “charity” in order to outsource refugee problems
to the Global South (cf. Loescher 1996). Empirical ex-
amples attest to this: for instance, the influx of Afghani
refugees into Pakistan paved the way for a five-year $3.2
billion aid package by the Reagan administration in 1981
(Loescher 1992).More recently, between 2001 and 2007,
Nauru received $30 million from the Australian govern-
ment in order to host refugees and asylum seekers within
the Nauru Regional Processing Centre, in addition to
Australia covering its operating costs, at $72 million for
2001–2002 alone (Oxfam 2002).1 This is not to suggest
that host states consciously encourage inflows of forcibly
displaced populations—rather, that an inflow of refugees
may constitute a strategic resource for these states’ gov-
ernments.
How does the strategic importance of these forcibly
displaced populations affect refugee host states’ foreign
policy decision-making? Two research agendas are rel-
evant in this regard: firstly, a small group of researchers
examines issue-linkage processes, suggesting that “win-
win” strategies may convince Global North states to
continue providing support for protecting refugees in
the South (cf. Hollifield 2012). As Betts argues, “in the
absence of altruistic commitment by Northern states
to support refugees in the South, issue-linkage has
been integral in achieving international cooperation on
refugees” (Betts and Loescher 2011, 20; Betts 2017).
1 Indicatively, Nauru’s 2001 gross domestic product was
$19 million.
Secondly, work on leverage suggests that host states are
also able to proceed unilaterally, aiming at extracting
resources from target states that fear being overwhelmed
bymigrants or refugees; Greenhill demonstrates that host
states may employ deportation in order to create targeted
migrant or refugee “crises” in target countries that, in
fear of being “capacity-swamped,” are likely to comply
with these states’ demands (Greenhill 2003, 2010). As a
result, Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, and Jordan have been
able to pursue issue-linkage strategies that manipulate
“migration interdependence” by linking the manage-
ment of cross-border population mobility to extracting
foreign policy and economic benefits from Western and
non-Western actors (Tsourapas 2017, 2018).
Two questions remain unresolved in existing theoriza-
tions of refugee host states’ policy-making: firstly, what
is the full gamut of foreign policies that these states may
employ in seeking to exploit the presence of a refugee
population group on their soil, beyond encouraging gen-
erations of outflows? Greenhill argues for three types of
refugee host states, namely “generators,” “agent provo-
cateurs,” and “opportunists”—which do not consider
states that aim to profit from forced displacement with-
out resorting to coercion. A second, related question is
the following: why do some refugee host states have more
aggressive foreign policy preferences, while others de-
velop strategies of policy coordination rather than coer-
cion? In other words, when do refugee host states adopt
a more coercive stance—reminiscent of Fidel Castro’s use
of the 1980Mariel boatlift to exert pressure on the Carter
administration—and when will they employ a more co-
operative one, as in the case of Pakistan or Nauru? In ad-
dressing these questions, this article contributes to the lit-
erature by presenting a more complete picture of refugee
host states’ foreign policy decision-making, as well as the
rationale behind it.
Theorizing Refugee Rentier States
The earlier examination of the economic benefits accrued
to host states by virtue of having refugee populations
within their borders points to the need to conceptualize
refugee populations as a resource fromwhich rent may be
extracted. The political science literature on rent and ren-
tier states is intimately connected with Global South and,
in particular,Middle East politics, albeit focusing primar-
ily on benefits provided by oil and other natural resources
to regional states (Sayigh 1991). A rentier state needs to
meet a number of criteria, mainly that it accrues at least a
significant amount of its national revenues from foreign
sources in the form of unearned income, or economic rent
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(Beblawi 1987).2 At the same time, its government needs
to be the principal recipient of this rent, while host state
actors are not engaged in the generation of such rent, but
on its distribution or utilization (Mahdavy 1970). In a
rentier economy,
reward—income or wealth—is not related to work
and risk bearing, rather to chance or situation. For
a rentier [state], reward becomes a windfall gain, an
isolated fact, situational or accidental as against the
conventional outlook where reward is integrated in
a process as the end result of a long, systematic, and
organized production circuit. The contradiction be-
tween production and rentier ethics is, thus, glaring.
(Beblawi 1987, 385–86)
While rentier state theorists do not discuss cross-
border population mobility, I introduce this framework
into international refugee politics. I argue that refugee
host states may adopt characteristics of a rentier state
with regard to their management of forced migration,
given that their governments are able to derive simi-
lar forms of unearned external income from a specific
resource—namely, the presence of refugee populations
within a state’s borders. For the purposes of this analysis,
a refugee rentier state is a state that hosts forcibly dis-
placed population group(s) and relies financially on ex-
ternal income linked to its treatment of these group(s).
Refugee rentmay come from international organizations
or third states in a variety of forms, including direct eco-
nomic aid or grants, debt relief, preferential trade treat-
ment, and so on. As per the expectations of rentier state
theory, refugee host state actors are not engaged in the
generation of such rent, but on its distribution or utiliza-
tion,whichmay ormay not directly relate to the domestic
management of forcibly displaced population group(s).
Finally, a refugee rentier state’s government remains the
principal recipient of this rent.
Some empirical examples allow the clarification of
the refugee-rentier-state concept: Libya’s reliance upon
European economic aid under Colonel Gaddafi in order
to prevent the outflow of sub-Saharan African refugees
into the Mediterranean suggests that it is a refugee
rentier state. the Libyan state was not involved in the
creation of these refugee flows out of sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Libyan government was the primary recipient of
substantial European economic aid. In contrast, the
2 Beblawi’s canonical text on rentier states does not de-
fine what a “significant” amount may be. I adopt this ap-
proach here, given that it allows for maximum flexibility
in understanding states’ behavior.
1923 population exchange between Turkey and Greece
generated more than two million forcibly displaced
persons and significant international economic support;
yet, given the involvement of both states’ governments
in the refugee-generation process, neither Turkey nor
Greece qualify as refugee rentier states. Since 1948,
Israel has witnessed the inflow of millions of Jewish
refugees, notably from the Arab world and the Soviet
Union; yet, it does not constitute a refugee rentier state,
for Israeli governments do not receive any external
income with regard to their treatment of these refugees.
In contrast, the significant economic aid afforded to the
Pakistani government in response to the influx of six
million Afghan refugees since 1979 renders it a refugee
rentier state.
As discussed in the previous section, the argument
that refugee host states may seek material gains from the
presence of displaced communities within their borders is
not novel. In fact, already in 1984, Weiner had asserted
that international migration may constitute a kind of
“national resource” (quoted in Teitelbaum 1984, 447). In
this line of thought, the rentier state framework allows us
a better understanding of states’ foreign policy decision-
making and the rationale behind it, if examined via the
prism of refugee rent-seeking behavior. I introduce two
key terms from the literature on interdependence: black-
mailing and back-scratching. For Oye, a central aspect of
contemporary diplomacy within a world of asymmetrical
power distribution involves the use of cross-issue linkage,
via two forms. Firstly, blackmailing involves “threats to
do something one does not believe to be in one’s interest,
unless compensated, and promises to refrain from doing
something one does not believe to be in one’s own inter-
est, if compensated.” A main example is the Organisa-
tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OAPEC)
oil embargo against the United States in 1973, which was
not in the interests of its member states. On the other
hand, back-scratching involves “promises to refrain from
doing something one believes to be in one’s interest, if
compensated, and threats to do something one believes to
be in one’s interest, unless compensated.” One example
of this is the post-1973 tacit agreement between Wash-
ington and Saudi Arabia to maintain oil production in
excess of Saudi financial needs (Oye 1979, 14; cf. Haas
1980). Keohane and Nye summarize the difference be-
tween blackmailing and back-scratching by arguing that
the first involves “making a threat one does not wish to
carry out,”while the second refers to “offering a quid pro
quo bargain” (Keohane and Nye 1987, 735).
Importing this model into refugee studies, I argue
that there are two ways through which a host state may
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exercise rent-seeking behavior in its foreign policy: via
blackmailing—threatening to flood target states
with refugee populations within its borders, unless
compensated—or via back-scratching—promising to
refrain from taking unilateral action against refugee pop-
ulations within its borders, if compensated. Although
back-scratching and blackmailing may be considered
as two sides of the same coin and the choice made by
refugee rentier states may often be less clear-cut, there is
value in understanding how the two policies may differ.
I operationalize them as follows: on the one hand, a
blackmailing strategy often includes threats of unilateral
actions to be taken by a refugee host state. Blackmailers
often frame their actions around potential losses that
a target state(s) may incur and show little interest in
international laws or norms. On the other hand, a back-
scratching strategy is usually framed around common
benefits accrued by cooperation. Back-scratchers tend
to value multilateral negotiations rather than bilateral
ones, and they believe that references to international
laws or norms strengthen their case.
In order to understand whether a refugee rentier state
will adopt a blackmailing or back-scratching strategy, I
proceed inductively via an exploratory three-case study
research design of the three main states hosting Syrian
refugees in the aftermath of the 2011 Syrian conflict,
namely Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. In choosing a for-
eign policy strategy, I expect states to make a rational cal-
culation based on their relative position and strength vis-
à-vis their target state(s). This is not a structural variable
based on geography alone: the relative position of Egypt
vis-à-vis Great Britain, for instance, diminished in the af-
termath of World War II once ensuring a safe passage
to India became less important to London. The relative
position of Pakistan vis-à-vis the United States increased
exponentially in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution
and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. A second
expectation of refugee host-state foreign policy decision-
making also involves an evaluation of itself vis-à-vis its
target state(s). State strength may be calculated in numer-
ous ways, but I expect the strength of a refugee host state
to lie in the size of refugee communities it hosts, given
that target states tend to estimate the significance of ac-
cepting refugees based on their numbers, rather than any
other indicator such as age, sex, or educational status.
As Teitelbaum and Weiner argue, the post–Cold War re-
alities suggest that the United States and other Western
states see migration flows less as instruments that “could
both weaken our adversaries and strengthen our friends”
and more as an imposition of “unacceptably high costs”
and security threats (Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995, 17;
Weiner 1996, 17). The following section offers a brief
discussion of the article’s methodology before proceeding
to the analysis of the three case studies in more detail.
Methodology and Case Selection
I employ exploratory case-study methodology for the
purposes of theory development through induction, and
I rely on covariation and within-case analysis (Bennett
and Checkel 2015). Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan have
been selected for they constitute the largest host states of
Syrian refugees. As of September 2018, more than 3.56
million Syrian refugees have registered in Turkey, which
currently constitutes the largest host state of Syrian
refugees. Syrians enjoyed visa-free entry into Turkey, as
part of a 2009 bilateral mobility agreement, until Turkey
closed border crossing points in 2015. Estimates for
Lebanon and Jordan vary, but they are acknowledged
to be the second and third largest host states of Syrian
refugees, with 1 to 2.2 million and 660,000 to 1.26
million Syrians, respectively. Jordan initially allowed Syr-
ians free entry, albeit with restrictions on employment.
Controls were gradually put in place, coinciding with the
opening of the Za’atari refugee camp in July 2012, until
border closures became more prominent since mid-2013.
Syrians in Lebanon enjoyed similar freedom of entry
but were also eligible to work based on the 1991 and
1993 bilateral agreements between the two countries.
From October 2014 onward, the Lebanese government
adopted the “October Policy” that tightened restrictions
on entry and residency for Syrian refugees.
The potential pitfalls of the case-study method have
been extensively examined in the literature (Geddes
1990; Collier and Mahoney 1996), particularly if cases
are selected on the dependent variable. Yet, a sizeable
body of political science research also identifies how “in
the early stages of a research program, selection on the
dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of
identifying the potential causes and pathways leading
to the dependent variable of interest” (George and Ben-
nett 2005, 23). Covariation is employed to substanti-
ate the study’s theoretical claims (Gerring 2016), while
within-case analysis is well suited to the “systematic ex-
amination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed”
(Collier 2011, 823). The combination of the two meth-
ods enables the use of qualitative tools to assess the causal
claims and mechanisms outlined in the previous section
(for comparison, Beach and Pedersen 2013).
A final note on data collection: field research in
the Global South contexts presents unique challenges
(Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 218), particu-
larly in light of the fact that regional migration is tra-
ditionally considered a security issue for ruling elites
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in broader Middle East. At the same time, research is
plagued by a lack of detailed, publicly available statistical
data on intra-Arab flows, a manipulation of statistics for
economic and political gain, as well as by the fact that mi-
grationmanagement is handled at the highest levels of the
executive (Tsourapas 2019, 24–30). As Brand (2013, 8)
wrote on seeking statistical data on the Jordanian politi-
cal economy, “one works under the assumption that such
documents will probably never be released or may never
have existed in the first place.” To overcome these issues,
I rely upon a meticulous collection of primary sources,
including Arabic and non-Arabic media reports collected
during fieldwork in Amman and Beirut (2017 and 2018).
For the purposes of triangulation, I also employ elite in-
terviews, reports, briefs, and communications by interna-
tional organizations and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) with regard to Syrian refugees in all three states.
Foreign Policy and the Refugee Rentier
State in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey
Jordan and the February 2016 Compact
To what extent does Jordan constitute a refugee ren-
tier state, and how has that influenced its foreign policy
decision-making? With regard to the Syrian refugee cri-
sis, the emergence of the Jordanian refugee rentier state
occurred gradually, from 2013 onward. This is primar-
ily evident in policy-makers’ attempt to render Syrian
refugees as visible as possible to the international com-
munity, while also aiming to inflate their numbers. De-
spite a welcoming policy between 2011 and 2013, Jor-
dan created the Directorate of Security Affairs for the
Syrian Refugee Camps in March 2013 and, two months
later, closed its border crossings with Syria, even to those
carrying valid passports (Syrians do not need a visa for
entry into Jordan). Palestinian Syrians, in particular, had
been denied entry since April 2012 and officially since
January 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2014). A number
of security reasons have been identified for these border
closures that highlight the potential risks for sociopolit-
ical unrest that a large influx of Palestinian-Syrians into
the country might entail. A state security rationale does
not, however, adequately account for the fact that Jorda-
nian border officers prompted Syrians to enter the coun-
try via informal crossings, instead; at numerous times in
the first three years of the Syrian conflict, the country’s
formal borders were closed to Syrian passport-holders,
who were encouraged to use informal border crossings
along the eastern border, instead.
While state security concerns were important for
domestic policy-makers, the shift in Jordan’s policy on
border crossings was primarily aimed at increasing the
international visibility of the Syrian refugee issue. Those
entering the country through informal crossing points
are automatically recognized as prima facie refugees,
according to the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) signed between Jordan and the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As
a result, with the contribution of aid workers, local
authorities were able to classify all Syrians entering into
Jordan as refugees, rather than visitors. Syrians entering
through informal crossing points were directly sent
to the Za’atari refugee camp, near Mafraq. Whereas,
in November 2012, Za’atari hosted some forty-five
thousand Syrians, by February 2013 it was home to
more than seventy-six thousand Syrians, a number that
reached 156,000 refugees by March 11, 2013. This
strategy enabled the Jordanian state to highlight that it
was facing a clearly enumerated influx of Syrian refugees
and to strengthen its appeals for international aid. The
Jordanian security official in charge of the Azraq refugee
camp,which was constructed inMay 2014, notes that “if
we hadn’t built the camps, then the world would not un-
derstand that we were going through a crisis” (Betts, Ali,
and Memis¸og˘lu 2017, 9). As Turner argues, “part of the
reason why Jordan built camps for Syrians is that it used
encampment strategically to enable it to raise the profile
of, and receive funds for, Syrian refugees on its territory”
(Turner 2015, 393). In fact, Jordan insists that the num-
ber of Syrians inside its territory well exceeds the number
of those formally registered; whereas the UNHCR puts
forth approximately 655,500 Syrians registered with the
United Nations inside Jordan, the government argues
that Jordan hosted 1.3 million Syrians in 2017.
A strong indication of Jordan’s refugee rent-seeking
behavior lies in its treatment of earlier forced displace-
ment, particularly Iraqi refugees that had entered its terri-
tory after 2003. By 2007, UNHCR estimated that Jordan
hosted approximately fifty thousand registered Iraqis,
but officials would claim that the number was between
750,000 and one million. This would cost the Jordanian
state $1 billion annually. An independent report by Fafo,
a Norwegian research institute commissioned by Jordan
to establish an accurate estimate, produced a figure of
161,000 Iraqis, but the Jordanian government continued
to inflate this figure. “We used to exaggerate the numbers
with the Iraqis, but we do not do that anymore,” one
high-ranking Jordanian official admitted, carefully not-
ing that “we are not exaggerating the Syrian numbers”
(Arar 2017a, 14). At the same time, Jordan did not place
Iraqis into camps, which has been identified as working
“strongly against Jordan’s attempts to secure increased
financial aid” (Turner 2015, 393). Camps can turn
refugees into a visible and “spatially legible population”
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(Peteet 2011, 18) and facilitate the counting of refugees,
which in turn can facilitate fundraising (Black 1998); in
Jordan’s case, the Iraqis were less visible to the interna-
tional community, something that Jordanians sought to
address with their management of Syrian refugees.
A number of domestic responses to Syrian refugees
have been developed under a refugee rent-seeking ra-
tionale, particularly the July 2014 “bail out” process.
According to this policy, Syrian refugees are permitted
to exit their assigned camps only when they are able to
secure a sponsorship from a Jordanian citizen, who has
to be more than thirty-five years of age, married, and
employed in a stable position. The Jordanian sponsor
should also be able to prove a family relationship with
the applicant and not have a criminal record (Amnesty
International 2013). While reliable data on this is not
available, the Jordanian state’s adoption of a bail-out
process has encouraged phenomena of corruption and
greed in the dealings between Syrian refugees and the
Jordanian social body; numerous instances have been
recorded of well-off Syrians that have been able to
“buy” their way out of Jordanian refugee camps, for
hefty prices. At the same time, the UNHCR has recorded
instances of Syrians paying middlemen around $500 in
order to be bailed out by unknown Jordanian citizens
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2013,
8). The fact that Jordan cancelled this scheme in 2016,
arguably once camp-enclosed Syrians who have been
able to afford a Jordanian sponsor concluded such
transactions, speaks to the state’s refugee rent-seeking
behavior.
With regard to foreign policy decision-making, the
Jordanian refugee rentier state relies upon securing
refugee rent from the international community. Negotia-
tions with donors culminated in the Jordan Compact, an
agreement drafted in February 2016within the context of
a London Pledging Summit. The Summit’s main objective
was the creation of two hundred thousand employment
opportunities for Syrians within the country over a three-
to five-year period. Jordan also agreed to lift regulatory
barriers in allowing refugees to work within the country
and to lower work permit charges for those seeking low-
skilled work from 700 Jordanian dinars to 10 Jordanian
dinars. The compact put forth three broader aims:
1. Turning the Syrian refugee crisis into a develop-
ment opportunity that attracts new investments
and opens up the EU market with simplified rules
of origin, creating jobs for Jordanians and Syrian
refugees while supporting the postconflict Syrian
economy;
2. Rebuilding Jordanian host communities by ade-
quately financing through grants to the Jordan Re-
sponse Plan 2016–2018, in particular the resilience
of host communities; and
3. Mobilizing sufficient grants and concessionary fi-
nancing to support the macroeconomic framework
and address Jordan’s financing needs over the next
three years, as part of Jordan entering into a new
Extended Fund Facility program with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (Government of Jordan
2016).
The contribution to the Jordan Response Plan re-
ferred to a funding package that aimed to support
Jordanian capacity to host refugees that, by 2016,
had only reached 30 percent of its target. In London,
$700 million of grants were raised with the expectation
that additional pledges would provide an additional
$700 million in 2017 and 2018. At the same time, the
World Bank adopted the Concessional Financing Facility
(CFF), which provided $147 million in low-interest
loans, available only to middle-income refugee-hosting
countries. Interestingly, although drafted within the
context of the donor conference on Syria, the compact
identified that “a new paradigm is necessary, promoting
economic development and opportunities in Jordan to
the benefit of Jordanians and Syrian refugees” (ibid.).
In particular, Jordan secured support for its wish to
boost its manufacturing sector by integrating refugees
into Special Economic Zones: “[b]y allowing refugees
to work in the SEZs [special economic zones], Jordan
hopes to attract the additional support needed to make
its own national development strategy work” (Betts et
al. 2017, 10). This was possible via tariff-free access to
the European Union market for goods produced within
SEZs with a certain degree of Syrian participation (15
percent) and provided that Jordan issues two hundred
thousand work permits to Syrians.
The provision of economic aid to the Jordanian
government via the Jordan Compact in response to the
Syrian refugee crisis is undisputed, with little doubt
that the international community’s support was due to
Western states being “keen to institute measures that
might help to stem the flow of refugees to Europe,” as the
Financial Times put it (Reed 2017). While international
aid to Jordan was linked to its treatment of the Syrian
refugee population, Jordanian elites also perceived of
this revenue as contributing to the country’s economic
development, within the broader aim of “turning the
crisis into an opportunity”—in other words, external
revenue constituted a form of refugee rent. It is important
to note that this discourse was espoused by World Bank
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policy-makers, as well as the international community.
Franck Bousquet, the World Bank Director for Regional
Programs and Partnerships in the Middle East and North
Africa, argued the following:
It is critical that today we begin to finance projects
to support vulnerable populations in Jordan and
Lebanon . . . [T]hese countries have made enormous
sacrifices to meet the global responsibility of provid-
ing refuge from conflict, and it is vital that the interna-
tional community unite to provide the long-term sup-
port that will help them both withstand shocks and
continue to develop and prosper. (World Bank 2016)
This narrative was immediately picked up by local
elites and policy-makers, shaping expectations and atti-
tudes on the ground. Jordan understands how “the idea
of turning the challenge of refugees into an economic op-
portunity is based on the protracted nature of the crisis,”
according to Imad Fakhoury, JordanianMinister of Plan-
ning and International Cooperation (Reed 2017). In mid-
2016, as the EU relaxed trade rules with Jordan in order
to create jobs for Syrian refugees, Fakhoury hailed this
as “an opportunity to transform the Syrian refugee crisis
to an economic opportunity” (Reuters 2016b). As Saleh
Kharabsheh, Secretary General at the JordanianMinistry
of Planning and International Cooperation, argued, “[the
CSS] will play a significant role in contributing to build-
ing the resilience of Jordan’s host communities and boost
economic growth so that we are able to provide basic ser-
vices and economic opportunities to both Jordanians and
Syrian refugees” (World Bank 2016). By February 2016,
once Jordanian policy-makers perceived international
economic aid as serving the country’s broader develop-
mental goals rather than merely addressing the Syrian
refugee crisis, Jordan embodied a refugee rentier state.
In its negotiations with the international community,
Jordan adopted a back-scratching strategy. For one, Jor-
danian elites highlighted the importance of multilateral
action and cooperation in dealing with the effects of the
Syrian refugee crisis in their country; “in a country of 6.6
million Jordanians, we have opened our doors to 1.3 mil-
lion Syrians fleeing violence in their homeland,” Queen
Rania declared at the 2016 United Nations Summit on
Refugees and Migrants, providing an inflated estimate
that is unsubstantiated by the UNHCR, “just as we have
opened our doors in the past to Palestinians, Iraqis, and
others seeking a safe haven.” She concluded by arguing
that, in view of Jordanian generosity, “it cannot fall to the
countries closest to the conflicts to shoulder this respon-
sibility alone” (“Queen Rania’s Speech at UN Summit for
Refugees and Migrants” 2016). But there is little doubt
that Jordanian elites aimed to reap economic benefits
from hosting Syrian migrants—for one official, 2016
(the year of the Jordan Compact) was “Jordan’s golden
year” (Arar 2017b, 308). In fact, as Jordan’s 2015 appeal
for international aid received less than one-quarter of its
$4.5 billion goal (Guardian 2015), the rhetoric intensi-
fied, but always framed in a back-scratching tone. King
Abdullah would repeatedly state how cooperation would
be a win-win strategy. In a February 2016 interview with
the BBC, he asserted the following:
[Western states] realize that if they don’t help Jordan
it is going to make it more difficult for them to be
able to deal with the refugee crisis. And, to be honest,
all the leaders that we talk to know that, by helping
Jordan, they are actually helping themselves more. So,
it is in their vested interests . . . I think the leaders of
the international community have the spirit to help
us. (BBC 2016a)
At the same time, the Jordanian monarch addressed
his appeals toward the international community and
adopted cooperative language: “the international com-
munity, we’ve always stood shoulder to shoulder by your
side,” he declared in February 2016. “We’re now ask-
ing for your help. You can’t say no this time,” he said
(BBC 2016b). Abdullah aimed to highlight the plight of
Jordan, rather than raise threats against other states: in
a September 2016 television interview, Abdullah argued
how “unemployment is skyrocketing. Our health sector
is saturated.Our schools are really going through difficult
times. It’s extremely, extremely difficult. And Jordanians
just have had it up to here. I mean we just can’t take it
anymore” (CBS News 2016). Ahead of a donor confer-
ence on Syria in February 2016, Abdullah became more
blunt: “I think it’s gotten to a boiling point . . . sooner or
later, I think, the dam is going to burst,” he warned. “We
can’t do it anymore” (BBC 2016b).
When asked whether a more assertive foreign policy
strategy would have been preferable, my respondents
appeared reticent. Most frequently highlighted was
the country’s relative position vis-à-vis the West. One
source in the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation laughed it off—“Send [the Syrian refugees]
where? Israel?” While no one disputed that the Syrian
refugee community in Jordan represented a sizeable
force, the fact that Jordan is landlocked with no path-
way to Europe was also frequently mentioned. As Arar
also notes, quoting a Jordanian official she interviewed,
“we should have blackmailed the EU like Turkey did”
(Arar 2017b, 25). An official interviewed in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates also doubted that a
different policy would bring results; he argued that the
influx of Iraqi refugees into Jordan following the 2003
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invasion went largely unnoticed by the United States. In
fact, back then, King Abdullah had famously declared
that Jordan is stuck between “Iraq and a hard place.”
Finally, the domestic repercussions of the Jordan
Compact merit analysis: the negotiations leading to the
Jordan Compact were based on the expectation that two
hundred thousand employment opportunities will be
provided for Syrian refugees, as a way of reducing their
dependence on aid. In practice, this has been difficult
given a slower-than-expected economic growth since
2016, high unemployment, as well as a lack of interest in
investing in Jordan’s business sector. By July 2017, only
sixty thousand work permits had been issued. This has
resulted in significant tension between Jordan and the
international donors,which was further fueled by the Jor-
danianMinistry of Labor decision to allow each Syrian to
carry more than one work permit. In an attempt to reach
the two-hundred-thousand mark, the Jordanian govern-
ment argued that work permits do not represent individu-
als: “the permits are work opportunities,” explained one
Ministry official. “It is possible for a Syrian to have more
than one permit in a year if he has more than one job”
(Betts et al. 2017, 11).
At the same time, in an effort to meet the requirements
of the international community and to not jeopardize
refugee rent inflows, Jordan has resorted to the tighten-
ing of restrictions on other migrant groups’ employment
within Jordan, namely the country’s five hundred thou-
sand to one million Egyptian workers. In June 2016, the
Ministry of Labor ceased recruitment of foreign migrant
labor, except domestic workers citing “the consequences
of the Syrian refugee crisis and the entry of large numbers
of Syrian refugees to the labor market” (Abaza 2016).
While Jordanian migration diplomacy has attempted
to leverage the status of Egyptian workers within the
country against Egypt before (Tsourapas 2018), it is the
first time that Egyptians are discriminated against in the
scramble to secure employment for Syrian refugees. For
Linda al-Kalash, the director of Tamkeen, a legal aid and
support center for migrant workers, “we are seeing a
huge campaign to expel Egyptians” (Ellouk 2017). This
has resulted in tight controls over Egyptians’ paperwork
by Jordanian authorities; according to Ahmed el-Sayed,
an Egyptian construction worker in Amman, “[t]hree
people were killed last week [August 2016] because
they were running from the police . . . [T]hey were
working at a construction site when the police came,
and in an attempt to escape they jumped from the third
floor and eventually died” (Abaza 2016). Ahmed Awad,
the director of the Phenix Center for Economics and
Informatics Studies in Amman, argued the following:
If Egyptian workers were already vulnerable and liv-
ing in precarious situations, the Jordanian govern-
ment’s resolution at the international donors con-
ference in London to issue work permits to [two
hundred thousand] Syrians (at no cost to em-
ployers) within two years further exacerbated the
situation. (ibid.)
Lebanon and the February 2016 Compact
In contrast to Jordan, Lebanon did not develop a policy
of placing Syrians into refugee camps, a decision linked
to its long background of enduring sociopolitical issues
arising from its construction of Palestinian refugee camps
(Shami 1999). Yet, Lebanon adopted a refugee-rentier-
state mentality that bears similarities to Jordan. In
matters of enumeration, the two countries share the pat-
tern of statistical inaccuracy in reporting Syrian refugee
stocks estimates: UNHCR reported 1,001,051 registered
Syrian refugees, but the organization was ordered to
suspend registrations as of May 2015. “The government
took a decision last October [2014] that included new
border measures for all Syrians and also asked [UNHCR]
to stop registering refugees unless in very exceptional
humanitarian cases,” an adviser to the Interior Minister
Nohad Machnouk reported to al-Jazeera. “Since the
beginning of this year, UNHCR has registered thousands
of new Syrians, which is basically in contradiction with
the Lebanese decision” (Gallart 2015). As a result, the
Lebanese government has been able to put forth a wide
range of estimates, going as high as 2.2 million refugees.
But evidence of refugee rent-seeking behavior is am-
ple: in January 2015, the government put forth legislation
detailing a novel process regulating Syrians’ residency in
Lebanon. All Syrians that are more than fifteen years of
age and registered with UNCHR were now expected to
pay a $200 annual renewal fee to the Lebanese state, an
amount that is exorbitant given that 70 percent of Syr-
ian refugees in the country fall below the poverty line.
Those who had not registered for the UNHCR were re-
quired to secure the “sponsorship” of a Lebanese na-
tional, similar to the earlier process established in Jordan.
In reality, UNHCR reported that Lebanese authorities re-
quested evidence of sponsorship even of Syrians that had
registered with them. This requirement has led to pro-
cesses of exploitation by Lebanese citizens, similar to the
Jordanian case: “sponsors are making a business out of
it,” one refugee reported. “They sell sponsorships for up
to $1,000 a person. Potential sponsors wait on the Syr-
ian border or at the airport to sell sponsorships to new
arrivals.” Another reported this:
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My boss makes me work more than [twelve] hours
a day at his shop. Sometimes I complain but then he
threatens to cancel my sponsorship. What can I do?
I have to do whatever he says. I feel like his slave.
(Human Rights Watch 2016)
According to a December 2014 directive by the Gen-
eral Security Directorate, Lebanese contractors would
be forced to bear the cost of sponsoring each Syrian
worker—estimated at $2,000 annually—and would in-
clude the “cost of work and residence permits, health
insurance, and notary contracts” (Shoufi 2015). As
Lebanese officials aimed to extract rent in the form of per-
mits by the private sector, this created a rift with the do-
mestic construction industry, which was already able to
profit from the influx of cheap Syrian labor. At the same
time, there have been frequent reports of Syrian refugees
getting arrested on a regular basis (in most cases exclu-
sively because of lack of legal residency, which is a crimi-
nal misdemeanor under Lebanese law). Exact data on this
is unavailable; however, NGO representatives have con-
firmed that, in most instances, the actual criminal case
neither reaches the courts nor results in a formal convic-
tion by a judge; this suggests that the various fees that
Syrians’ families end up paying actually constitute un-
official bribes to the administrators of police detention
facilities—or, in this article’s argumentation, another di-
mension of refugee rent.
More prominently, Lebanon has not hesitated to de-
port Syrian refugees back to their home country. As early
as 2012, Human Rights Watch identified processes of
disrespecting the principle of nonrefoulement in Lebanon
with regard to fourteen Syrian deportees (Human Rights
Watch 2012). More frequently, Lebanese authorities
grant temporary papers to unregistered Syrian refugees,
with strict deadlines for producing legal documents,
which would require they return to Syria. Since mid-
2014 Lebanon has been monitoring border crossings
in order to “deregister” Syrian refugees that cross into
Syria—with sixty-eight thousand Syrians having their
status revoked between June and October 2014 alone
(Janmyr 2017). It should come as no surprise that the
Lebanon Compact makes an explicit reference to “ease
the temporary stay of Syrian refugees, in particular re-
garding their residency status.”According to one refugee,
things are changing, and now the army is going in
and arresting people in their homes, not waiting for
them to come to checkpoints . . . When they came to
take everyone, they took [twenty-seven] people. They
took every male above the age of [fourteen] for four
days. And they took all our documents and gave us
one week to sort out our residency . . . It would have
required going back to Syria . . . So none of us could
do anything, [and] now we’re all illegal in the country
. . .My only hope is to get out of Lebanon, to get some-
where where I can educate my children. (Alabaster
2016)
Lebanon’s attempts at attracting external economic
aid are not dissimilar to those of Jordan. In December
2014, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan was launched
in Berlin as part of the Regional Refugee and Resilience
Plan. It stated that Lebanon has “shown exceptional
commitment and solidarity and has welcomed around
1.5 million refugees fleeing war-torn Syria [as] Lebanese
communities have opened their schools, their clinics,
and even their homes to hundreds of thousands” of
Syrian refugees. At the same time, however, the inflow
of forcibly displaced Syrians created “overwhelming
pressures” on Lebanese institutional structures that
were “threatening its longer-term stability.” In response,
the plan aims to ensure the well-being of Syrians in
Lebanon, but to also provide support for the Lebanese
state:
1. Ensure the protection of vulnerable populations;
2. Provide immediate assistance to vulnerable
populations;
3. Support service provision through national
systems;
4. Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, and envi-
ronmental stability.
The plan initially sought a total of $2.48 billion for
2016, to implement programs by the Lebanese govern-
ment and the international community. In its 2017–2020
planning, Lebanon proposed for $2.8 billion in aid, in
consultation with the United Nations. It also enjoyed
access to CFF, as per World Bank decision. The dis-
course around Lebanon’s access to low-interest loans was
reminiscent of Jordan’s. According to Philippe Lazzarini,
United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
in Lebanon,
Dealing with long-term displacement crises requires
innovative responses. Humanitarian support and de-
velopment assistance need to be coordinated in order
to increase the capacity of host communities and insti-
tutions from day one.Through close coordination and
collaboration with theWorld Bank and other partners
and donors, important concessional development as-
sistance will be available for Lebanon to improve eco-
nomic conditions, create jobs, and transform the crisis
into new opportunities.
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At the same time, in February 2016, Lebanon nego-
tiated the Lebanon Compact, which enjoyed EU support
and included a minimum of €400 million ($455 million)
for 2016–2017, over and above existing pledges. As in
Jordan, the EU framed the compact as aiming “to turn
the situation into an opportunity to improve the socioe-
conomic prospects, security, stability, and resilience of the
whole Lebanon.” The international aid that Lebanon re-
ceived given its status as a host state for Syrians included
significant amounts of refugee rent. In particular, beyond
funds targeted toward Syrian refugees, the compact
allocated:
€15million to boost Lebanon’s productivity and com-
petitiveness in the agribusiness and wood sectors . . .
€13 million for the implementation of the National
Plan to Safeguard Children and Women in Lebanon
across the country . . . €1.5 million to reinforce the
capacity of the Ministry of Youth and Sports to better
address youth issues, including a €800,000 [program]
addressing drug abuse . . . €48 million for solid waste
management [programs] in addition to €5 million for
the construction and equipment of [one] solid waste
treatment facility and [one] sanitary landfill . . . €2mil-
lion to support the Lebanese Parliament, resulting in
reactivation of the Legislative Tracking System in the
Lebanese Parliament (European Commission 2016).
Much like Jordan, Lebanon employed a back-
scratching strategy in negotiating the 2016 compact
agreement. This relied, as with Jordan, on appeals to mul-
tilateralism and cooperation on an international level,
rather than threats. Echoing the Jordanian monarch’s
declaration, Prime Minister Saad Hariri has repeatedly
stated how he intends “to make sure that the world
understands that Lebanon is on the verge of a break-
ing point” (Reuters 2017a). At an April 2017 Brus-
sels conference on Syria, Hariri argued for the interna-
tional community to commit $10,000 to $12,000 per
refugee in Lebanon over a span of five to seven years,
while ensuring that this “would equally benefit Lebanese
citizens and displaced Syrians” (Al-Jazeera 2017). “We
have enough,” Interior Minister Nohad Machnouk de-
clared in January 2015. “There’s no capacity any more
to host more displaced” (Associated Press 2015). Accord-
ing to Lebanon’s Minister of Social Affairs, Rashid Der-
bas, “the glass cannot fit one more drop . . . now we
have 1.2 million [refugees]. I think this is a very excep-
tional proportion” (Human Rights Watch 2016). Speak-
ing to Politico in July 2017, Hariri expanded on how a
small country of some four million Lebanese dealt with
this:
Yeah, 4.5 million, so you can imagine the bur-
den, and how much it is difficult. And we believe
Lebanon is doing a public service for the entire
world, and I believe Lebanon should be also com-
pensated for that, because if those refugees didn’t
come to Lebanon, they would be everywhere in the
world . . . The international community needs to
help Lebanon, especially the refugees because with
1 percent growth in Lebanon, we cannot manage
to have jobs for the Lebanese and the Syrians.
(Glasser 2017)
Officials approached for comment in Beirut high-
lighted the fact that Lebanon did not have a functioning
government between March 2013 and December 2016,
following the resignation of Prime Minister Mikati. The
general perception was that Lebanon did not have strong
international allies or bargaining chips. “Ce n’est pas
nous qui dictent les règles du jeu” (“It is not us that call
the shots”), according to an official interviewed in the
Ministry of the Interior, which is tasked with respond-
ing to the Syrian refugee crisis. The point of whether
Lebanon’s proximity to Cyprus, an EU member state,
may be important was also dismissed. Despite hosting
the most refugees per capita of any country, Lebanon is
not considered a gateway to Europe; despite a waterway
to an EU member state (Cyprus), Syrian refugees have
avoided the island because it offers neither an easy way
into the rest of the continent (Reuters 2017b), nor a sim-
ple asylum process, with only 3 percent of asylum seekers
granted refugee status: “[Cypriot officials] want to give
refugees the message: [d]on’t come to Cyprus because if
you do, you won’t get refugee status,”according to Doros
Polykarpou, executive director of KISA, a Cypriot non-
profit, “and it works” (Karas 2015).
Turkey and the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement
Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees, with
more than 3,591,714 registered as of November 2018
(3RP Turkey 2019), and exemplifies refugee rent-seeking
behavior. That said, Turkey differs in its treatment of
them from Jordan and Lebanon in that it combines
a number of refugee camps, primarily located across
the border with Syria, while also allowing the vast
majority of Syrians to reside across Turkey, particularly
once the twenty-two camps, or Temporary Protection
Centers in S¸anlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, and elsewhere in
southern Turkey had been filled to capacity. The status
of refugee rentier state is evident in the conclusion of
long EU-Turkey negotiations that culminated in the
2016 “deal.” This was preceded by an October 2015
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Joint Action Plan and a €3 billion package that was
negotiated with the EU in November 2015 (European
Council 2016a). This evolved into the March 2016
Statement, which added another €3 billion in aid, if
Turkey agreed to a readmission of Syrians arriving in
Greece and tighter border controls—a system resting on
the (precarious) basis that Turkey constitutes a safe third
country, which does not allow asylum-seekers in Turkey
to move on to another state. For every Syrian returned to
Turkey in the scheme, the EU pledged to resettle another
in Europe, up to a cap of seventy-two thousand. In
return, the EU made a number of concessions, including
promises that
[t]he fulfilment of the visa liberalization roadmap will
be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa require-
ments for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of
June 2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to
fulfil the remaining requirements . . . The EU will,
in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up
the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion
under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these
resources are about to be used in full, the EU will
mobilize additional funding for the [f]acility up to
an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018 . . . The
EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the
upgrading of the Customs Union. (European Council
2016b)
The European Commission agreed to provide €1
billion in funding, with €2 billion of additional fund-
ing from member states (European Council 2016a).
The administration of the €3 billion support was orga-
nized through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey,
which focuses on six priority areas: humanitarian assis-
tance, migration management, education, health, munici-
pal infrastructure, and socioeconomic support (European
Commission 2017a). As of June 2017, forty-eight
projects have been contracted worth more than €1.6 bil-
lion, out of which €811 million has been disbursed. As
its one-year report states, “projects will notably ensure
that [five hundred thousand] Syrian children have ac-
cess to formal education; [seventy] new schools are built;
2,081 teachers and other education personnel have re-
ceived training and two million refugees will get access
to primary healthcare services” (European Commission
2017b). Similar to Jordan and Lebanon, the concessions
that Turkey gained involved issues that were not immedi-
ately linked to the Syrian refugee crisis—the most evident
one being the visa-liberalization process. The promise to
reenergize the accession process exclusively benefitted the
Turkish state and had no impact upon the country’s non-
Turkish population.
Unlike Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey developed a
blackmailing strategy in its foreign policy decision-
making with regard to its international management of
the Syrian refugee crisis. This is evident in the threat-
ening discourse that Ankara elite engaged in, targeting
Brussels and EU member states. Minutes of a February
2016 meeting between Erdogan, Tusk, and Juncker (later
confirmed by Erdogan) have the Turkish prime minister
openly threatening to flood Europe with displaced Syri-
ans (Reuters 2016a). The discussion included the amount
of capital Turkey had spent on hosting displaced Syrian
refugees: in October 2015, for instance, the Turkish Inte-
rior Ministry announced that Turkey had spent more $8
billion to support Syrians, “surpassing the Turkish Inte-
rior Ministry’s budget” (Kızılkoyun, 2015). But Turkey’s
rationale was better served by a blackmailing strategy:
“we want this human tragedy to end,” Prime Minis-
ter Ahmet Davutoglu declared in 2016, detailing how
Turkey wanted “our citizens to travel visa free, and the
customs union to be updated” (Associated Press 2016).
Interestingly, the outflow of refugees via the Aegean
Sea into Greece and, subsequently, the rest of Europe,
effectively ceased in the aftermath of signing the EU-
Turkey deal. Until early 2016, the large flows of irregular
migrants from Syria into Europe via Turkey allowed the
enrichment of a wide number of Turkish nationals asso-
ciated with smuggling via the Aegean Sea, which imme-
diately stopped in March 2016; in Istanbul, one of these
smugglers, interviewed by the New York Times, boasted
more than $800,000 in profits, and having “more than
[eighty thousand] missed calls from prospective cus-
tomers” (Kingsley 2017). In Izmir, al-Jazeera identifies
how $1,000 would allow a smuggler to “launch boats
unmolested by police or gendarmes for a day” (Reidy
2016). Following the EU-Turkey deal, all smuggling busi-
ness stopped; the smuggler identified by the New York
Times is now considering opening a seaside café, instead.
Turkey’s blackmailing strategy continued following
the signing of the 2016 deal. One day after the Euro-
pean Parliament called for a pause in the country’s EU
accession talks over the Turkish government’s repressive
response to a July 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan declared
that “we are the ones who feed 3–3.5 million refugees
in this country . . . You have betrayed your promises. If
you go any further those border gates will be opened”
(Pitel and Beesley 2016). This raises an important point
with regard to the domestic political repercussions of
refugee rent-seeking, particularly with regard to refugee
host states’ governments attempts at consolidating au-
thoritarian rule. The European Parliament’s decisions are
not binding for individual member states; however, ob-
servers were keen to note that Erdogan’s warnings had
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come a few days in advance of the second round of the
Austrian 2016 presidential elections. Brussels’ response
was rather lackluster: “rhetorical threats are absolutely
unhelpful and should not be the standard tone between
partners,” one senior EU official noted on the record.
“This will not help Turkey’s credibility in the eyes of Eu-
ropean citizens. Europe will not be blackmailed” (ibid.).
The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Regional
Perspective
All three states examined above fall under the category
of refugee rentier states, given the fact that they received
external economic aid that was dependent on their status
as hosting forcibly displaced populations and that they
came to rely on substantial external rent linked to their
continuous hosting of these refugee populations. This
refugee rent is encapsulated in the three agreements
negotiated between these refugee rentier states and the
international community—the February 2016 Jordan
Compact, the February 2016 Lebanon Compact, and
the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, respectively. At
the same time, as per the paper’s theoretical framework,
their foreign policy with regard to the refugee issue
falls under the broad strategies of back-scratching and
blackmailing. Jordan and Lebanon broadly employed a
back-scratching strategy: although domestic elites made
urgent pleas for help, they highlighted multilateralism,
tended to approach the matter with reference to the
responsibility of the international community to help,
and praised the positive-sum value of interstate cooper-
ation. Turkey, on the other hand, employed a different
strategy that came closer to blackmailing: elites made
little reference to cooperation or multilateralism and put
forth distinct threats that aimed to coerce their target
audience, rather than ensure cooperation.
What accounts for this variation in policy-making?
The data collected suggests that Lebanon and Jordan
were not able to employ a blackmailing strategy, even
though there was a desire to follow Turkey’s example.
While the sizeable community of Syrian refugees was
deemed important, the two countries’ relative positions
and elites’ doubts on their countries’ strategic importance
appeared to rule out a more forceful or aggressive pol-
icy. In the Turkish case, however, elites’ perceptions of
the country’s geopolitical importance—particularly with
regard to the proximity to Greece—appeared to have en-
abled the government’s blackmailing strategy. The geopo-
litical importance of the host state appears to matter
with regard to Jordanian and Turkish strategy histori-
cally: back in the late 1960s, King Hussein did not hes-
itate to use Jordan’s hosting of thousands of Palestinian
refugees in order to blackmail the United States for a so-
lution to their status. This can be explained by the signif-
icant geopolitical importance of Jordan in the late 1960s
as the major United States ally in the region, a status
that the country has since lost. Similarly, Turkey’s behav-
ior post–Gulf War—when, in 1991, it successfully black-
mailed the United States on the fate of Kurdish refugees
within its borders—was also predicated on its strategic
importance for Washington at the time (details on both
cases: Greenhill 2010, 296–97, 316–17).
A number of alternative explanations of the three
refugee rentier states’ behaviors are unconvincing. What
about the argument that Jordan genuinely sought a
cooperative solution to the Syrian refugee crisis or that
it would not consider the deportation of Syrians for hu-
manitarian reasons? This is discounted by two policies
that Jordan developed domestically: firstly, the “bail out”
process strongly suggests that Jordan aimed to employ
the Syrian refugee issue for economic gain. Furthermore,
Jordan did engage in the marginalization and deporta-
tion of migrant populations—that of Egyptians, which
undermines the argument that state policy was driven
by a humanitarian rationale. With regard to Lebanon, a
number of policies discount the potential counterargu-
ment that Lebanese back-scratching policy resulted from
its human rights protection record or, put differently, that
officials would not consider deporting Syrian refugees
for humanitarian reasons. For one, not only did Lebanon
order UNHCR to stop registering new refugees, but,
in January 2015, the government put forth legislation
detailing a novel process regulating Syrians’ residency.
More importantly, however, Lebanon has not hesitated
to deport Syrian refugees back to their home country.
Could the Turkish policy of blackmailing be accounted
for via alternative explanations? One such explanation
could be that Turkey was unable to control its European
borders and, therefore, was forced to a policy of con-
frontation rather than accommodation with the EU. Yet,
empirical facts discount this argument, particularly given
the impressive decrease in crossings across the Aegean
Sea since the signing of the EU-Turkey deal. Turkish state
officials, in other words, were more than able to secure its
European borders when they had the incentive to do so.
Conclusion
This article has examined how forced displacement
affects the foreign policy decision-making of refugee
host states. In doing so, it has attempted to move
beyond discussion of coercion and to highlight the
range of strategies available to host states of the Global
South by drawing on the literature on rentier states
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and issue-linkage strategies. Through an exploratory,
three case-study design, it has introduced the concept
of the refugee rentier state and identified strategies of
blackmailing and back-scratching in these states’ refugee
rent-seeking behavior. Through a within-case analysis
of Jordanian, Lebanese, and Turkish responses to the
post-2011 Syrian refugee crisis, it has theorized how
international aid to refugee host states constitutes a
form of rent. In response, refugee host states’ refugee
rent-seeking behavior appears to result in a blackmailing
strategy when it contains a large number of refugees and
when states’ elites perceive of their country as having
geopolitical importance vis-à-vis the target state(s)—as
in Turkey. Alternatively, state elites are more likely to opt
for a back-scratching one—as in Lebanon and Jordan.
To what extent do the strategies of back-scratching
and blackmailing apply beyond the three cases outlined
here? The article findings appear to apply to both cur-
rent and historical cases. One could argue that states
that find themselves in a geo-strategically-important po-
sition and face an influx of refugee populations are histor-
ically prone to strategies of blackmailing. Back in 2002,
Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko aimed to
employ Belarus’ status as a refugee rentier state of Chech-
nya’s refugees when he “threatened to flood the Euro-
pean Union with drugs and illegal migrants” unless he
was allowed entry into a November 2002 NATO sum-
mit (Shepherd 2002; Greenhill 2010, 327). Libya’s prox-
imity to Europe and its status as a host state for sub-
Saharan African refugees had also led Gaddafi to demand
an annual payment of €5 billion by the EU in order to
prevent it from “turning black” with refugees back in
2009 (Paoletti 2010; Tsourapas 2017). More recently, in
2015, Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias warned that,
if Greece was forced out of the Eurozone, “there will
be tens of millions of immigrants and thousands of ji-
hadists” into Europe (Waterfield 2015). It appears that,
when refugee rentier states host a sufficient number of
refugees and enjoy an important geostrategic location
vis-à-vis their targets, they are likely to develop a foreign
policy strategy of blackmailing.
Beyond blackmailing, refugee rentier states are also
engaging with back-scratching strategies. Ethiopia’s
negotiating strategy resulting in the 2019 “Jobs Com-
pact,” a $500 million program that aims to create one
hundred thousand jobs for Ethiopians and refugees, is
one example (Reuters 2019). In the Middle East context,
the EU has concluded a number of “Mobility Partner-
ships” with Morocco in June 2013, Tunisia in March
2014, and Jordan in October 2014 that offer certain
perks to these states in return for their management of
irregular migration and refugee flows (Collyer 2012).
While these countries may be considered geostrategically
important for Europe, they lack large numbers of Syrian
refugees that would allow them to pursue a blackmail-
ing policy. Historically, Pakistan relied on extensive
American economic support for hosting more than
one million displaced Afghans in the aftermath of the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—while Pakistan
contained a large number of refugees, relations with the
United States were tense and it had yet to become the
geopolitically important state it is today.
The article advances a research agenda that explores
how forced displacement affects states outside the Global
North by identifying the ingenuity of governments that
are dependent on extracting resources from the interna-
tional system. It identifies numerous paths for further
scholarly and policy debate on how to understand the
behavior of refugee host states: for one, moving beyond
foreign policy decision-making processes, what are the
effects of refugee rent on states’ domestic political devel-
opment? Anecdotal evidence from the article’s three case
studies suggest that forced migration increases opportu-
nities for state corruption, which would be consistent
with the pathologies associated with rentier states. More
broadly, given that refugee rent is, by default, awarded to
governments, what effects does this produce in terms of
instances of violence or the durability of autocratic rule?
The well-established literature on rentier states opens
up a novel dimension of exploring the effects of forced
displacement within the subfield of comparative poli-
tics. The mechanisms and dynamics of host-state use of
refugee populations in their international relations con-
stitute an important, underexplored field of inquiry in the
study of world politics.
Beyond academic work on international relations and
comparative politics, the phenomenon of refugee rents
carries important policy-level repercussions with regard
to the ethical and normative dimension associated with
Western states’ decision to link economic aid to the man-
agement of refugee populations in the Global South.
There is a palpable risk that encouraging overburdened
states to treat forcibly displaced populations as sources of
economic rent leads to refugee commodification. Should
refugee host states’ governments be condemned for de-
veloping coercive foreign policy strategies to cope with
forced displacement? Do such strategies constitute an ex-
ploitation of Western states’ vulnerabilities and the defi-
ciencies of the international system, or are they merely a
skillful way of “playing a bad hand?” At the same time,
to what extent is a migration management system based
on refugee rents sustainable in the long run? Identify-
ing the perils of refugee commodification is not a moral
condemnation of host states across the Global South,
particularly given the disproportionate share of refugees
they are tasked with managing. Rather, it highlights how
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the encouragement of refugee rent-seeking behavior as a
solution to refugee burden-sharing problems and the
absence of multilateral cooperation may produce unin-
tended effects for the future of global migration gover-
nance.
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